Quick notes on the value of a village and the value of a housewife.

The value of the village, of real community support where you can easily have someone come over is 100k per year.

The articles from years and years back about how a housewife’s labor is worth 250k a year missed the real implication, which is that the *husband* would need to make that much to cover all the value-adds this platonic-ideal housewife was providing.    But then, that is dangerously close to the actual situation with SAHMing in many married households.

Related to something else, instead of the poor choices of long commutes or telecommutopia or “no really if we keep spending billions on light rail everyone will take it to their green jobs”, we could have satellite offices for many desk-type jobs and make the 400k vice presidents actually earn that money making the rounds weekly or monthly to touch base.  It “splits the difference” with commuting by slashing it in many industries but also keeps local money more local because a lot of the “oh they’ll just buy everything with amazon” is from being exhausted from hours of driving. Cut that by 75% and you can have real stores and get better quality even without major price increase, since there’s been a race to the bottom with shipping costs and delivery of consumer goods.

Ultimately tens of millions of people are being shoved around by the whims of a few hundred thousand, and that is changeable.  Extremely so.

 

“A deer won’t fix it”: A few words against struggle love and romanticizing low income life.

Ripped from someone’s childhood:

It was getting towards the end of class time in Algebra I and Susanna, who’d read Little House on the Prairie to pieces, was talking to another student about how much she loved country music and how cool it was to hunt for your food even if you were poor and such.

The teacher, unusually for the free time at the end of class, cut in.  “You haven’t been poor, it’s not ‘cool’.”

“But couldn’t pa just, like, hunt deer for you all?”

“You have no idea what it’s like to really be poor. A deer won’t fix it!” The teacher didn’t have to go on.  Susanna never mentioned country music or deer hunting ever again.

The teacher was a wise woman.  A deer won’t fix the leaky roof, or serve as a winter coat.  A deer won’t fix the blisters when your shoes are worn bare and there aren’t going to be any more because your older brother ran away and you almost feel bad that your first thought was hoping he’d left his Sunday pair behind, because they weren’t too worn and only a little big on you.  A deer won’t fix it.

In one of those interesting confluences that transcends race, both the wider black community and the wider right-wing community have a tendency to romanticize poverty and “struggle love”.  That the kids coming out of many of those unions aren’t so enamored about the idea of being married and incredibly poor is waved away as them being too spoiled, somehow.

The discussion here is a good example of right-wing folks romanticizing the struggle and presenting extended periods of poverty as unalloyed good.

They were discussing, dismissively (but somewhat justifiably), this person’s wicker basket of issues around “emotional labor” that strictly speaking she doesn’t have to do and mostly isn’t labor.

Yet the problem with the emotional labor complainer lady isn’t gender, or even money.  A lot of the time, the obstacles to normal life aren’t financial, but from the vantage of those with no financial resources anyway, it can seem like “proof” that money doesn’t fix anything, so why worry about whether you have any?

A deer won’t fix the toothache.  Or the gap between your kid’s college scholarship and your empty pockets.

Poverty isn’t inherently unworthy, but there’s a difference between preparing a child for the possibility and spinning up a tale that it always works out and will in fact basically be “broke-college-student” level temporary.   It’s an ideal of struggle-life where you’re not actually lacking the roof, or the full belly, or the warm coat, or the well-fitting decent shoes.  You just have low income but all basic needs completely met.  This is pretty bitter aloes for anyone who jumps into low-income marriage on purpose without any prep and finds out it’s not very romantic or easy and that married poverty without a strong local community or regionally suitable skills to “make do” can be devastating and corrode a marriage bond to a brittle snapping point.

A deer won’t fix it.  Only frankness and realistic discussion about the tools needed to “survive and thrive” as a low income household with children could.   Not romanticism and rosy glosses on what some couple did decades or generations ago.  That leads to people seeing marriages blow up over the poverty or how bad it is for the family and mistakenly thinking that the solution is more dakka money.  But we could all make less money as married households if the sheer value of close relationships and getting along with other people were taken seriously society-wide.

 

From college to modular education.

The evidence is pretty clear that the college-for-all model has missed enough intelligent, capable people that we keep taking stabs at modular educational models, oriented around sitting for exams and completing x number to demonstrate competency.  This has the benefit of matching up more with actual white-collar, highly paid work these days, which is frequently project-bound but open-ended as to how you complete it and it also has the benefit of not costing average or below intelligence people buckets of money if they can’t hack it, which will be at least as frequent as it is now.  But there’d be tiers they could hack and still get decent pay.

It’s also an approach that works well with unionizing/guild-izing at even very high pay levels.

It wasn’t that bad a model for IT, although rampant fraud combined with unrestricted immigration broke it, but then rampant fraud combined with unrestricted immigration is a major part of why college is no longer much of a filter for what college-educated parents believe it to be a filter for.  That model is returning in IT with the bootcamp approach, where depending on the subfield, anywhere from 1/100 to 1/20 workers is coming out of 6-18 month bootcamp straight into employment full-time, usually at wages above 50k/yr.  And that is a large percentage given how little time the model itself has had to form up.  But companies are already arranging their hiring around pulling in some bootcamp people and having a special process for that.  In contrast it took decades to see the same for the “diversity and inclusion” industry, which is more reliant on racking up degrees for that pipeline.

We now live in a world where an 18 or 19yo can already have a bachelor’s degree if they are really set on doing so without having to leave home and sometimes without even spending money.

We have something like 75,000 18 and 19yos a year graduating with BAs, MAs or PhDs/JDs (mostly BAs).  We have 125k or so with AAs.

The AA by 19 pool is 60% male, the BA+ by 19 pool is probably (estimates are pretty spiky) 80% male.   The AA numbers are almost 10% of the total (~1.5-1.7million) for age 20-24 AAs and the BA+ numbers are around 2-3% of the total (around 3.4 million) for 20-24 BA+.  And even among 20-24yos, we are up to roughly a quarter million with an MA or higher.

Given how rapidly the early college thing is increasing, it may be that we start seeing 300, 400, 500k such people annually over the next decade. This would be in line with the trend that began, as far as NCES recording of it, in the early 1990s, when about 1 in 5 people over age 25 had  BAs or  higher (all races) and the younger set finishing college young was a few thousand which over 20 years increased by an order of magnitude.

College completion has flattened in recent years (what marginal increases are happening, interestingly, are putting male completion of BAs ahead of female completion in the latest data after years of the opposite) and at this point the mix of *how* it’s completed is changing, so we’re no longer getting more and more people across the line, but instead having more and more “weird” ways of finishing increase.

The difference between righty and lefty extremism

Extremism on the right tends to lead to formation of a nuclear family doing something unusual and outlier-y, which fairly frequently goes nuclear. On the left, extremism tends to strip the extremist of family attachments and not always gain them political or social power, but the right believes that all left extremism works and is effective politically and socially including for the extremists.

This was never all that true, even among the Boomer-aged cohorts and with the Gen X and younger age cohorts it’s fallen apart rapidly. It’s the unseen and the seen from our man Bastiat. With the left, the right tends to believe in political WYSIWYG (the seen), while the left conversely imagines up endless waves of right wing conspiracies behind every door (the unseen).

The right looks at what it sees with the left being occasionally successful with screaming and hysterics and assumes lefties get everything they want via screaming and hysterics all the time, constantly.  The left interprets its successes over the right as failures proving there’s endless right wing conspiracies to prevent them from total and complete dominance.